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Abstract  
 
Globally, there are so much information security 
threats on Internet that even when data is 
encrypted, there is no guarantee that copy would not 
be available to third-party, and eventually be 
decrypted. Thus, trusted routing mechanism that 
inhibits availability of (encrypted or not) data being 
transferred to third-party is proposed in this paper. 
Algorithmization, requirements analysis and 
architectural challenges for its development are 
presented.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As recent development had shown that transferring 
confidential data over global data telecommunication 
network (GDTN) is no longer all that secure 
considering the fact that in best-selling routers are 
being embedded secretly different kind of ―agents‖ 
for manipulation of traffic passing through those 
routers without the knowledge of the owner. Mostly 
this agents (implants) are embedded for the purpose 
of exploitation, to get ―ungettable‖ [1].  Like the kind 
of halluxwater, stuccomontana, genie, 
gourmettrough, souffletrough, jetplow, 
sierramontana, headwater and feedtrough which 
could be found in cisco, juniper or Huawei 
networking devices [1, 2]. Some of these implants 
allow for complete control of router using hidden 
channels for information transmission. They are 
persistent. They survive an upgrade or replacement of 
the operating system, even some survive physically  
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replacing the router's compact flash card. They 
modify operating system of networking device and 
enable covert functions to be remotely executed 
within the networking device via an Internet 
connection [1, 2].  
 
Owing to the fact that communicating confidential, 
sometimes very critical, data over Internet is 
unavoidable; and the usage of Internet, which relies 
on telecommunication networks (TN), is ever 
increasing which exposes hundreds of millions of 
people worldwide to threats and risks, as Internet is 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, it is paramount to have a 
mechanism of routing data from sender to recipient 
through those routing devices (RD) that are trusted 
Author in [3] confirmed that the routing control 
security mechanism is suitable for the realization of 
traffic confidentiality. Thus, as there are suitable 
security mechanisms described in GOST ISO R 
7498-2-99 — Security Architecture that can be 
applied appropriately to protect the information 
exchanged between the application processes in the 
circumstances for which protection of 
communication between systems is required, those 
security mechanisms were analyzed to have in-depth 
knowledge on how routing control as a security 
mechanism is suitable for the realization of 
confidentiality and traffic confidentiality. This allows 
to understand that one of these protection 
mechanisms is a routing control mechanism, by 
which routes or paths can be chosen dynamically, or 
by such prior distribution, which uses only physically 
secured subnet, repeaters or data links [4]. 
Consequently, this routing control mechanism 
requires confidence (trust) in the intermediate nodes 
and therefore must be supplemented by a general 
architectural mechanism of trust functionality, to 
obtain fundamentally a new mechanism — a trusted 
routing (TR) mechanism (Fig. 1) which is process of 
planning and organizing information flow on a 
calculated route through TN nodes, excluding the 
possibility of tampering with the information in any 
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form while the information stream is passing through 
those TN nodes [5]. 
 
 
Security Mechanisms
(GOST R ISO 7498-2-99)
5.3. Specific 5.4. Pervasive
5.3.4. Data Integrity
5.3.3. Access Control
5.3.5. Authentication exchanges
5.3.6. Traffic Padding
5.3.2. Digital Signature
5.3.8. Notarization
5.3.1. Encryption 5.4.3. Event Detection
5.4.5. Security Recovery
5.4.1. Trusted Functionality
5.4.2. Security Labels
5.4.4. Security Audit Trail
Trusted Routing
5.4.1.1 Any functionality providing or accessing security 
mechanisms should be trustworthy. Trusted functionality 
should be used to expand the scope of, or increase the 
effectiveness of other security mechanisms
Planning and organizing information flow on a calculated route through TN nodes, excluding the possibility of 
tampering with the information in any form while the information stream is passing through those TN nodes
5.3.7. Routing Control
5.3.7.1 route might be chosen to use only 
physically secure network components +
=
 
Figure 1: Structure of Security Mechanisms revealing Trusted Routing Mechanism 
 
However, TR mechanism (that hereafter referred to 
as TraConDa — Transfer Confidential Data, for 
transferring confidential data securely in global data 
telecommunication network e.g. Internet) is not 
widely used in GDTN to combat information security 
threats (IST). One of the reasons is the lack of 
knowledge about its potentials, properties and 
implementation. Therefore it is necessary to deeply 
investigate the TR mechanism to provide evidence-
based recommendations for its usage in GDTN and, 
if necessary, improvement. In view of the 
aforementioned, the purpose of this paper is 
establishing implementation methods, conditions, 
tools, and application boundaries for TR mechanism 
thereby presenting its architecture and requirements 
analysis.To achieve this goal, TR mechanism was 
investigated for its algorithmization, software 
implementation procedures, evaluation of its 
efficiency and recommendations for its improvement, 
which required addressing several research 
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objectives, which are analyze the possibility of 
implementing TR mechanism in GDTN using 
"regular" tools in TCP/IP; if necessary, develop 
special tools for TR; synthesize software architecture 
management system for TR; evaluate the 
effectiveness of the TR mechanism in GDTN and 
make recommendations for its improvement. To 
achieve these research objectives are used modern 
research methods among which are collect, organize 
and analyze of scientific and technical information; 
systematic, cause-effective and comparative analysis; 
functional and structural synthesis; simulation; 
planning and processing of experimental results. 
 
Since should  routing control and trust functionality 
security mechanisms, described in GOST R ISO 
7498-2-99 [6], are combined to have a kind of TR 
mechanism (Fig. 1), confidentiality and integrity of 
data being transferred on a network can be 
guaranteed. Further we analyze the possibility of 
implementing TR mechanism in GDTN using 
"regular" TCP/IP tools, and where necessary (when 
TCP/IP tool is not adequate), we develop special tool 
for TR; but before then, search for related works on 
TR mechanism is done to analyze other security 
mechanisms, for example MPLS VPN, that are 
having trust functionality. 
 
1.1. Related trusted routing mechanism 
Much work has been done to provide for data 
security via TR, among many known technics been 
studied is the one used in [7], method of secure 
routing based on degree of trust in which data can be 
routed through the chain of nodes, wherein at least 
one node has a lower confidence level, while the 
remaining nodes have acceptable levels of 
confidence. In the method is proposed creating and 
using an encrypted tunnel in the case when there 
is/are node(s) with an unacceptable level of trust and 
subsequently decoding the data in the TN when the 
node with an acceptable level of trust is found. 
However, the encrypted data, ultimately, can be 
copied or deleted by RD that does not inspire trust, 
and or be decrypted by third parties. There exist 
another method described in [8] in which the level of 
trust of nodes is determined when nodes establish 
trust by sending authentication messages encrypted 
with the shared secret key that was initially generated 
by a central authority and provisioned to nodes in a 
network for ensuing traffic encryption, and thereupon 
adding each other to their respective trust lists. In this 
method, in some cases, the problem arises when the 
exchange of general symmetric encryption key is 
compromised during attacks for the purpose of 
unauthorized access to information being transmitted. 
As a result, it is impossible to ensure the 
confidentiality and or integrity of data in TN during 
data transmission by providing the trusted path in TN 
through which the data passes from the sender to the 
recipient. 
 
In [9], the authors propose a method of message 
security using trust-based multi-path routing. They 
give lower number of self-encrypted parts of a 
message to a fewer trusted nodes thereby making it 
difficult for malicious nodes to gain access to the 
minimum information required to break through the 
encryption strategy. Also they avoid unnecessary 
redundancy and non-trusted routes that may use brute 
force attacks and may decrypt messages if enough 
parts of the message are available to them, using trust 
levels. 
 
For trusted computing, Jarrett, M. and Ward, P. [10] 
propose using trusted computing to prevent 
misconfigured or malicious nodes from participating 
in the network by providing additional security in 
open computing environments that allows software to 
prove its identity and integrity to remote entities. 
Closest to the technical solution by this proposed 
software model is [11, 12]. In [11], it is proposed to 
establish the level of trust of the route using a variety 
of Internet routers and sender‘s router with the help 
of information about the levels of trust of routes that 
is received as supplementary information from each 
router on the route through the Internet.  Evaluate the 
explanatory information received via the Internet 
about the levels of trust to determine the adequacy of 
the level of trust of a route. When the sender‘s router 
receives the route, it determines whether the level of 
trust is acceptable using the information from the 
database (DB). If the route is acceptable, it sends a 
message of confirmation of this route as a code 
RSVP-TRUST to all nodes of this route. Otherwise, 
it transmits a message RSVP-TEAR to all nodes of 
that route, i.e. that the route is not trustworthy. 
Further, the sender‘s router continues to choose the 
route to the recipient router until an acceptable route 
is found or till when the availability of routes is 
exhausted. This is done to implement a TR; however, 
the selection of routes is not great and not very 
reliable, because, although the number of routes is 
defined by routing algorithm, yet the route is selected 
among all the nodes of TN, not excluding untrusted 
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nodes. This reduces the trustworthiness of the route 
chosen as in it can be node that does not inspire trust. 
Author in [12] proposed an alternative method of 
protecting the information without the use of 
encryption algorithms while the information is being 
transmitted in distributed networks that are being 
subjected intentionally to malicious attacks. The 
author developed client-server application to aid in 
data transfer over distributed networks, which allows 
user to transfer data using specific route in order to 
avoid the traffic flow across zone controlled by an 
attacker. Of course the method allows to significantly 
reduce probability of class of active network attacks 
but within a distributed network. Also there is a 
possibility that the attack on trusted servers will be 
successful. The author, of course, in this case, 
proposed incorporating multiplexing algorithms, 
which further ensures the security of information 
being transmitted. Nonetheless, attacker could still 
get part of the information being transmitted, if not 
all. 
 
According to Tiamiyu (2013) as well as Hills (2005), 
VPN extends private network services for 
organization(s) across a public or shared network 
infrastructure such as Internet or service provider 
backbone network and it has capabilities for 
tunneling mechanism (encapsulation), based on RFC-
1234 [13], support for various protocol and 
scalability, and may span multiple IP Autonomous 
Systems (AS) or Service Providers). Also MPLS 
VPN as a trusted VPN is a high-performance 
telecommunication network [13, 14] that allows data 
transfer within a network using labels, which are the 
information attached to the packet that tells every 
intermediate router, label-switch router  (LSR), to 
which egress edge label-switched router (E-LSR) it 
must be forwarded. Also that MPLS is IP-compatible, 
thus it integrates easily with traditional IP networks. 
Furthermore that in MPLS, packets are routed along 
pre-configured label switched paths (LSPs), and 
packet flows are connection-oriented [13, 15 & 16], 
and that cryptographic tunneling is not being used in 
MPLS (like other trusted VPNs) as trusted VPNs rely 
on the security of a single provider's network for 
security of the traffic [13].  
 
Considering all mentioned above, VPN method (and 
by extension, MPLS VPN) is also simple and more 
effective like the author's proposed method, method 
of TR but security by encryption and tunneling do not 
exclude potentially untrusted network or network 
nodes from participating in the routing of data to 
ensure a high degree of data security. The privacy 
afforded by VPNs was only that the communications 
provider assured the clients that no one else would 
use the same circuit. This allowed clients to have 
their own IP addressing and their own security 
policies. A leased circuit ran through one or more 
communications switches, any of which could be 
compromised by someone interested in observing the 
network traffic. 
 
In VPN, the Internet connectivity and the subsequent 
tunneling are dependent upon ISP i.e. it is usually 
impossible for a user to know the paths used by 
VPNs, or even to validate that a trusted VPN is in 
place; they must trust their provider completely. And 
as the data tunnel is rendered across multiple routers, 
rogue tunnel can be established and an accompanying 
rogue gateway. Being part of the tunnel, these 
intermediate rogue routers can examine/copy/modify 
the data should they be malicious even if the packets 
are encrypted. In such a case, the sensitive user data 
may be tunneled to the imposter's gateway. Thus 
data, which is encrypted between VPN client and the 
VPN endpoint, can be seen while traversing public 
networks from sender to receiver [17, 18], and as a 
result a VPN-based networks implementation can be 
attacked in many ways. Some of the possible types of 
VPN attacks are attacks against VPN protocols, 
cryptanalysis attacks and denial-of -service attacks. 
And as VPN traffic is often invisible to IDS 
monitoring when the IDS probe is outside the VPN 
server, as is often the case, then the IDS cannot see 
the traffic within the VPN tunnel because it is 
encrypted. And as such if an intruder gains access to 
the VPN, the intruder can attack the internal systems 
without being picked up by the IDS.  
 
Furthermore, in VPN, PPTP and even L2TP are not 
provided robust security mechanisms against rogue 
ISPs and tunnel routers. Though the advanced and 
comprehensive encryption capability provided by 
IPsec does offer a high degree of protection against 
these rogue elements yet if node replication which is 
the process of incrementally copying, or replicating, 
data that belongs to a client node is in effect, data is 
replicated and possibly decrypted.  
 
VPN though provides confidentiality such that even 
if the network traffic is sniffed at the packet level, an 
intruder would only see encrypted data. But the fact 
that the encrypted data is available to the intruder is 
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also a big threat as the intruder could one way or the 
other gets encrypted data decrypted as there exists 
possibility that encrypted data copied while being 
transferred over Internet sometimes may eventually 
be decrypted when the same encryption algorithms 
then used has become weak encryption algorithm e.g. 
case study of DES and AES (DES is breakable as the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation built a DES-cracking 
machine that can find a DES key in an average of a 
few days' search [19]. AES is still unbreakable (still 
unbreakable implies it could be breakable in the 
future considering the claims by team of researcher 
as elaborated in [20])). But this is unacceptable for 
certain confidential information that has to remain 
confidential now and in the future e.g. certain 
medical and research information, military 
information and so on. 
 
According to Bhaji (2008), ―a security policy is a set 
of rules, practices, and procedures dictating how 
sensitive information is managed, protected, and 
distributed‖ [21], thus if security policy by either the 
sender or the receiver stipulates that the data should 
not be available to third party or routing devices in 
certain locations, whether encrypted or not, then data 
has to be routed securely from sender to receiver in 
such a way that data is not available to intruder(s), 
either encrypted or not. And this is of paramount 
importance as then the intruder has no data to 
examine/copy/modify, so to say, the intruder has no 
data to tamper with in any form. 
 
In MPLS either of sender and receiver may not be 
located outside the MPLS domain because even if the 
MPLS domain is properly configured, that its internal 
structure and the core network is not visible to 
external networks (and thus protected against various 
attacks, e.g., DoS-attacks), the data are subjected to 
various attacks outside the MPLS domain i.e. when 
they cross the border of MPLS-domain. To ensure 
that data is tranferred reliably and securely through 
trusted node, MPLS provides ability to control where 
and how traffic is routed on privately owned network, 
manage capacity, prioritize different services, and 
prevent congestion. But this is only possible only 
within the MPLS-domain.  
 
Thus, deep analysis of VPN (MPLS inclusive) on the 
subject matter, TR, revealed that basic architecture of 
MPLS network does not provide security services 
such as encryption, unlike VPN. Therefore, MPLS 
does not protect the confidentiality of data, especially 
outside its domain [18, 19 & 22]. However, MPLS or 
IPsec VPNS, GETVPN (Group Encrypted Transport 
VPN) and DMVPN (Dynamic Multipoint VPN) use 
IPsec, robust encryption algorithm, to ensure data 
confidentiality [22, 23 & 24]. Nonetheless, IPsec 
relies on the Internet for transport and, thus, third-
party can still get copy of encrypted data [25]. 
 
1.2 Open issue 
Though the methods analyzed above are good and 
acceptable since, to some extent, they provide for TR. 
However, the open issue is still how to prevent third 
party from having copy of the data being transmitted, 
encrypted or not. Since having a copy of the data in 
encrypted form does not guarantee that the third party 
would not be able to decrypt the data. It could be a 
matter of time. Also the third party may play other 
known and unknown pranks on the data being 
transferred. This issue is being addressed in the 
implementation of TraConDa that is based on trusted 
routing mechanism by preventing third party from 
having copy of the data being transferred. Since no 
copy implies nothing to be decrypted, and no access  
-nothing to play pranks on. 
 
Moreover, if the data is properly encrypted, how can 
one be sure that solution has not been gotten to that 
encryption method/mechanism already though it is 
believed to be most reliable security 
method/mechanism? Maybe it is just yet to be made a 
public knowledge (because of personal interest of 
developer to spy on others or national 
policy/interest). As explained earlier on, present 
strong encryption can be a weak encryption later as a 
result of technological advancement and eventually 
encrypted data could be decrypted and made a public 
knowledge that could result into many things among 
which is war if it is military secret, bridge of contract 
(if it is medical record not meant for public 
knowledge). 
 
So, what is the essence of encryption if the encrypted 
data could be decrypted later, because of 
technological advancement, which is very possible in 
these modern days? And as one can only decrypt, if 
possible, only what is accessed or accessible; no data 
or no access to data implies nothing to decrypt either 
now or later. 
 
As a result, architecture and analysis of requirements 
for TraConDa is paramount. Thus, TraConDa 
implementation stages are subsequently described. 
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1.3 Implementation stages of TraConDa 
Having analyzed various security mechanisms and 
some of other works done by researching community 
worldwide, especially MPLS VPN, the conclusion is 
that TR mechanism procedures to guarantee 
confidentiality of data transfer over GDTN like 
Internet should comprise the following stages: 
 
- defining topology of network that is 
participating in information transfer 
Topology is defined at initial stage and it entails 
gathering route information (for example, with the 
help of traceroute using IP-option and utility like 
icmp) and routing table information (by accessing 
routing table via SNMP or BGP protocol), prepare 
topology map based on the information gathered, 
resolve problems/conflicts associated with IP-aliases 
(many works are done on mapping topology of 
networks, e.g. Internet, among which are works done 
by authors in [26, 27 & 28];  
 
- extended identification of RD  
Extended node identification process entails 
gathering information and identifying possibility of 
remotely getting access and controlling any of 
devices within the map created, and subsequently 
converting them to trusted routing device (RDt) when 
necessary and where possible (conversion to RDt 
could as well be achieved by introducing program 
module into OS of RD following the work done by 
authors in [29, 30 & 31]). In the interest of extended 
node identification could be used WHOIS server (for 
georeferencing), traceroute utility, Nmap port 
scanning as well as SNMP traffic interception. For 
remote access to TN nodes can also use SNMP brute 
force attack on password, HTTP-vulnerabilities 
exploitation, brute forcing a Telnet password, DHCP-
service exploitation, SNMP-vulnerability exploitation 
and so on. 
 
– defining trusted route  
This is done by finding some optimal and shortest 
active routes from sender to recipient within the map 
using algorithms by authors in [321] and save the 
active routes found into DB. Thereafter, the RD 
within those active routes are converted to RDt, if 
possible, after gaining remote access to them. Then 
trusted route is either calculated using modified 
Dijkstra‘s algorithm [33], the algorithm that finds 
trusted shortest path (the path that comprises of only 
RDt as described by Tiamiyu (2014). Alternatively 
trusted route could be selected analytically by finding 
at least a route that passes only through a set of RDt 
from a packet sending point (initial IP-address) to a 
packet receiving point (destination IP-address);  
 
- forced routing (traffic control) and 
monitoring of regenerated network  
This stage is about redirecting traffic along trusted 
route, i.e. path comprising only RDt (by source 
routing, for instance), and monitoring status of RDt 
in the interest of TR mechanism. 
 
All these stages of TR mechanism are further 
described in details in the subsequent chapters. 
 
2. Trusted routing mechanism 
architectural requirements and 
implementation algorithms 
 
On architecture of execution, the most efficient is a 
two-level scheme for the construction of TraConDa, 
which includes TR manager (TRM) and TR agent 
(TRA) for traffic control (TC) and BCCH (backup 
control channel) as their interacting interface. TRM is 
installed to automated workstation (AW) where data 
traffic control takes place in the interest of TR. TRA 
are implanted to some RD participating in data 
transfer within the network to which AW is 
connected. The modified OS image i.e. OS image 
with TRA embedded as program module (PM) can be 
copied to RD using tftp protocol [34].  
 
Also there is possibility of recording any code and 
switching OS to execute it while RD is still 
operational, which provides the possibility of 
realizing extra control mechanisms of RD. Such a 
possibility of changing the OS code during operation 
allows carrying out automated embedding by 
connecting PM straightaway (without modification 
and packaging of OS image file, load it via tftp and 
reboot RD). More details on the embedding TRA and 
other components within structure of TraConDa is 
subsequently discussed in details in Section 2.1. 
Modular structure of TraConDa is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2: Modular structure of TraConDa 
 
2.1. Trusted routing agent embedding as a 
functional requirement in TraConDa 
Embedding TRA as a functional requirement in 
TraConDa entails getting remote access and control 
to nodes in TN. And subsequently embed PM in the 
form of TRA to OS of the nodes. When embedding 
PM, according to [31], compressed OS image is the 
first to be disassembled and then analyze its content 
to find out how and where to insert the PM and 
thereafter embed codes, repackage it so that it can be 
installed back to the RD. And repackaging includes 
corrections to checksum of the modified OS image (if 
necessary) and adjusting header (for ELF - header 
and sections, and for MZIP - header and checksum 
recounting) so that it can pass through the startup 
tests, which may prohibit the modified OS image file  
from running on the RD when the checksum is not 
correct. 
 
Considering the works of the authors in [29, 30 & 
31], developing and embedding PM should be carried 
out as follows: 
1. Identify and detect OS module version of 
the RD; 
OS image file can be downloaded from RD using 
FTP or TFTP server. 
 
2. Disassemble and analyze the OS image in 
the IDA Pro Disassembler;  
When carrying out the analysis, first thing to do is to 
detect and identify functions in disassembled OS 
image. In the work by the author of [31], IDA pro 
was used. 
 
3. Analyze disassembled OS image further 
using IDApython and correct errors 
allowed by IDA pro Disassembler in the 
functions allocation;  
The author of [31] used IDApython to further analyze 
disassembled OS image to get critical information for 
the survival of PM to be embedded. Since several 
functions and links would not be found using only 
IDA Pro, the author used IDAPython in the 
recognition process of functions and strings as well. 
 
4. Develop PM to be embedded; 
OS is written in C (with low-level assembler 
insertion in the kernel), linked with the help of 
compiler gcc (with certain modifications, for 
example, scripts for assembling) and has a modular 
design [30]. Thus, the idea follows that PM can, 
likewise, be developed for embedding also in C 
language to obtain machine codes that should be 
linked to the original OS image, i.e. copy to the 
selected inactive memory area.  
 
5. Select area in the disassembled OS image 
where PM will be embedded; 
There are three areas suitable for embedding PM, 
which are free levelling area (area between the data 
and code segments), area in a code segment and area 
in a data segment [30].  The author in [31] choose 
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data segment to place the code, sacrificing debug 
line, which is almost, probably, will never be used as 
there are a lot of such strings in OS of RD, for 
example, in all versions of Cisco IOS. The author 
further decided to write a NULL (zero) character to 
the first symbol to prevent the string from causing 
problem, as well as to avoid suspicion from the user, 
if the system administrator decides to use some 
functions of OS, which require that line. 
 
6. Prepare the selected area for embedding 
process; 
As necessary, make changes that are needed for 
preparation («deactivation») of selected memory 
area, for example, in the case of using strings, its 
truncation [30]). 
 
7. Embed PM into the selected and already 
prepared area of the disassembled OS 
image file; 
Identifying offset of the selected area in the 
disassembled OS image file and placing segment(s) 
of PM into the field.  
 
8. Connect the embedded PM; 
This is done by replacing instructions (function calls) 
in the modified OS image file, with instructions 
(function calls) of the PM. This requires the 
replacement of transition address (or offset) in the 
function call instructions. Setting up the right calls 
inside PM, as well as OS function calls from the PM.  
Connecting modules by calls transfer method 
requires changing the call instruction and depends on 
the architecture of processor. For instance, for MIPS 
processors, value of the call instruction is low 28 bits 
of the address of the called function, shifted by two 
bits to the right while for PowerPC processors, value 
of call instruction is 26-bit difference (with sign) 
between the address of the called function and the 
call instruction. 
 
9. Repackage the modified OS image. 
This should include corrections to header of 
packaged OS image. So also correction to checksum 
of the modified OS image (if necessary). After all 
these, the modified OS image can be installed to RD 
and tested. Flow-chart of processes involved in 
embedding TRA into OS of RD (RD to RDt 
Conversion) is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Start
Identify and detect OS 
module version of the RD
Disassemble OS 
image 
Analyze OS 
image
Correct errors in the 
disassembled image, e.g. in 
the functions allocation
Select area for embedding
Size of PM < selected 
area for embedding?
Develop/correct PM to be 
embedded  taking into account 
the features of the OS of RD
Prepare the areaCopy PM to the area
Replace instructions 
(functions calls)
Correct checksum 
(if necessary)
Repackage 
modified OS image
Add/correct header
Load OS to RD
Request to select another 
area for embedding
Modified copy of OS 
of RD exists in DB?
End
Y
Y
Testing 
Record copy of 
modified OS to DB
N
N
Modified copy of OS of 
RD exists in DB?
Y
N
 
Figure 3: TRA into OS of RD embedding process (RD to RDt conversion process) 
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2.2. TraConDa operation algorithms 
Getting TraConDa for traffic control (TC) in TN 
necessitates development of algorithms for operations 
of TRA and TRM. 
 
2.3. Trusted routing manager operational 
designation and method 
TRM for TC is designed to create secured 
communication channel for TRA remote control; 
exercises control over functioning of the TRA (i.e. 
after embedding, PM allows to have full control over 
RD as then the control is transferred from OS of RD 
to the PM. Thus the RD is remotely control by TRM, 
and as TRA carries out instructions contained in 
special packets via BCCH from TRM, TRM controls 
functioning of TRA); generates and transmits control 
commands to TRA. Also it is designed to gather 
information about routes and RT of routers as well as 
identifying and obtain specific (active) route of 
traffic. Furthermore, it is designed to implement 
georeferencing, TC and displaying or printing of 
results (Fig. 2). 
 
TRM accomplishes some of these tasks by adding or 
changing information about the composition and 
characteristics of the transit routers and the 
functioning of TRA whenever necessary and getting 
responses from TRA in form of messages containing 
information about results of executing the command. 
For program realization of the required tasks of 
TRM, the following modules are being utilized. 
Trusted routing stages execution (TRSE) module. It 
is main module in TRM and it provides for 
interaction of other modules by supporting among 
others initialization, synchronization, execution and 
monitoring of their algorithms. TRSE is managed via 
interaction interface (I/F) module through which 
expert launches TraConDa and performs basic 
control (for example, login, shutdown etc.). 
Manager‘s network interface (MNI) is being used to 
provide interface with network as well for data 
encryption (decryption) and launching of network 
utilities as well as sending instructions to TRA. 
Database (DB) module renders high-level data access 
interface to other modules (for example, getting IP-
address of trusted route among others). Maintain 
channel in trusted state by verifying and monitoring 
nodes is the purpose of node verification (NV) 
module. Node controlling (NC) module is for 
conversion of node to trusted entity. And for process 
of routing of data along specific route is used trusted 
routing implementation (TRI) module. Information 
analysis (IA) module is for analytical processing of 
information. 
 
DB is local to AW, and it stores information that is 
used in TraConDa. Modular structure of TRM as part 
of TraConDa is shown in Fig. 2. 
TRSE module essentially manages the DB module, 
MNI module, IA module which can be regarded as 
auxiliary within the structure of TraConDa. DB 
module interacts with the DB by means of 
instructions. It provides data only on request. 
 
NV module realizes monitoring of system status by 
carrying out periodically extended node identification 
along trusted channel using MNI module. Whenever 
untrusted node is found along route of data transfer, 
NV module signals to TRSE module about this, 
which brings about an instantaneous usage cessation 
of the trusted path and possibility of search for 
another. Thus, NV module works in parallel with 
TRSE module in the background and it is considered 
a «TRM demon». 
 
By request from TRSE module, NC module initiates 
process of converting node to trusted entity. For this, 
it uses a formalized information about node and 
generates a request for its modified OS from DB, if 
available. In response, the module receives the 
required OS and loads it to the RD (hardware node) 
by establishing automated remote access to the node, 
for example, using FTP (TFTP) (whenever this 
operation is successful, RD becomes RDt). Also, by 
the request from TRSE module, TRI module initiates 
the process of routing confidential information along 
given trusted route. TRI module, for this, receives 
information about trusted route from DB and 
redirects information along the route, (the process of 
forced routing). 
 
In normal mode, TRM expects command from the 
administrator of AW and listens to BCCH while 
awaiting messages from TRA. When commands are 
received, TRM enters regime of command execution. 
Information about route or RT received from TRA 
are stored in DB after (if necessary) preprocessing 
like formalizing RT view. The followings are some 
of commands TRM executes: 
 
Command № 1 – Get RT using SNMP 
By command 1, RT of a specific router is received 
from specified TRA via SNMP routing protocol. The 
processes involved are select the desired router from 
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list of available routers; generates necessary 
command to get RT via SNMP protocol (Fig. 4); and 
verify availability of the received RT in the DB. 
Access to RT of the specified router via SNMP 
control protocol is implemented within command 
execution block (Fig. 2) within TRSE module by 
activating block that implements access method via 
SNMP.  Routes are MIB objects. According to the 
MIB requirements, each route in the DB of router 
corresponds to a record [35]. TRM generates to MIB 
standard SNMP-request according to the standard 
procedure of SNMP protocol, (1.3.6.1.2.1.4.21 
ipRouteTable and 1.3.6.1.2.1.4.21.1ipRouteEntry) 
where iso(1), identified-organization(3), dod(6), 
internet(1), mgmt(2), mib-2(1), ip(4), 
ipRouteTable(21) and ipRouteEntry(1) [36, 37]. On 
getting a response, TRM then connects with the 
specified router via SNMP and starts recording 
information about RT from the router. On starting, 
TRM receives response from the specified router  
with information about the destination, 
‹ipRouteDest›, and then sends ‹get-next› request to 
the router to get the next parameter: interface index 
‹ipRouteIfIndex›. By sequentially sending request 
‹get-next› and receiving response from the router, 
TRM receives detailed information of all the records 
(for example, IP-address destination, destination 
interface, next-hop, protocol code, route mask etc.) 
that are located in the RT of the specified router. 
Detailed information about RT of the router is 
recorded into DB for further analysis and for 
preparation of active route(s). This cycle is repeated 
for other routers [37, 38]. Flow-chart of processes 
involved in this method, as a result of executing 
command № 1 (Get RT using SNMP), is shown in 
Fig. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Start
Select RD to receive RT 
from 
End
Response 
received?
Process information 
received
Generate SNMP-enable packet request
Y
N
Populate packet with 
SNMP reply 
information received
SNMP is still 
enabled?
Send SNMP-request 
packet
Y
Generate signal message 
<no-snmp-reply>
N
 
Figure 4: Getting RT in TraConDa using SNMP 
 
Command № 2 – Get RT using BGP 
By command 2, RT of specified router is received via 
BGP routing protocol (Fig. 5). The processes 
involved are similar to that of getting RT using 
SNMP protocol but here, BGP-session is opened with 
the selected router instead of enabling SNMP. And 
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the BGP-session is broken with the selected router 
after receiving the RT or when keep-alive signal 
stops. Whenever BGP-session is established with a 
specified router successfully, the router begins to 
share its RT with TRM. RT information exchange 
with TRM begins with the help of packet ‹update›. 
On the TRM, the following control fields are filled: 
IP - address of the router; Version – BGP version; AS 
- autonomous system; hold time - 180. Then TRM 
effects primary assessment and analysis of RT 
information contained in the packets «update» and 
generates information obtained (information like 
Host BGP IP, Unfeasible Routes, Length NextHop, 
Next Hop, Length ASPPath, ASPPath, Networks 
etc.) [39], and sends it to DB. Flow-chart of 
processes involved in this method, as a result of 
executing command № 2 (Get RT using BGP), is 
shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Start
Select RD to receive RT 
from
Hold-time exceeded?
Y
Trigger timer
End
Response 
received?
Generate packet <break-BGP-
session>
Generate request packet to open BGP-
session with the RD
N
Await  time exceeded signal
N
Y
N
Populate packet with information 
in BGP response
Keep-alive?
Send BGP-request 
packet
Y
 
Figure 5: Getting RT in TraConDa using BGP 
 
TRA can simultaneously support BGP-session with 
multiple routers and this allows receiving in real-time 
RT of different routers or changes occurring within 
them [39].  
 
Command № 3 – Get route using IP-option 
By command 3 TRM implements tracing of data flow 
between two specified RD using parameter IP option 
(Fig. 6). This process involves selecting a desired or 
specific RD as destination using DB where list of 
active routes among others are stored, and then 
generates necessary command to trace packet route 
(Fig. 4). After receiving the results of the trace, 
analyze the received route of information flow and 
verify availability of the received route in the DB. 
This signal from TRM to get route down to a 
specified IP-address of a specific RD using IP-option 
is based on the parameter ‹‹record route›› option field 
of IP-packet and it is designed to obtain information 
about the active route of the information flow 
(traffic), i.e. list of IP-addresses of all transit routers 
down to the specified router, in between the sender ( 
and recipient, another remote but specified RD 
(remote RD_x, where x is 1 to n
th
 number of RD. e.g. 
RD_1, RD_2…RD_n). TRM as sender includes in 
the packet parameter ‹‹record route››, thus, IP-
address of every transit router participating in the 
delivery of the packet is stored in the packet. 
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Therefore, along with the packet, RD_x as recipient 
receives a list of all transit routers «visited» by the 
packet and then generates and sends response packet 
containing list of IP-addresses of all these transit 
routers and that of RD_x. Having received the 
response packet from RD_x, TRM effects 
preprocessing of the data about traffic flow and sends 
received information to DB. Flow-chart of processes 
involved in this method, as a result of executing 
command № 3 (Get route using IP-option), is shown 
in Fig. 6. 
 
Start
Select destination node for tracing
Response 
received?
Y
Send the packet to the selected node
Await time exceeded 
signal
Send packet containing received route 
to initial node
Send packet to initial node
Destination node process 
received packet
Generate packet containing message <selected 
node unreachable
N
Generate IP packet at initial node
Enable option 7 – «record route»
Time exceeded?
N
Y
Initial node process received packet
End
 
Figure 6: Packet Tracing algorithm using IP-option parameter 
 
 
Command 4 – Get route using ICMP-request 
By command 4 is implemented tracing of data flow 
using ICMP-request to a specific RD with a given IP-
address (Fig. 7) and this necessitates, in sequence, 
selecting a desired RD, and then generates necessary 
command to trace packet route.  Thereafter analyze 
the received route of information flow after receiving 
the results of the trace, and finally, verify availability 
of the received route in the DB. Whenever signal 
comes from TRM requesting route to a specific IP 
address using ICMP-request, within command 
execution block in TRSE module (Figure 2), as usual, 
is activated corresponding block that implements the 
method of tracing data flow using ICMP-request. 
Basis of tracing data flow using ICMP-request is the 
use of field value TTL (Time to Live - the lifetime of  
the transmission of packet) located in the IP-header 
and ICMP-message ‹Time Exceeded›. Two 
techniques being used to trace packet route to the 
destination are small values of TTL and invalid port 
number (for example, 33434) [40]. 
 
For the detection of intermediate routers between 
TRM, for instance, and the specified router, ICMP-
request packet with a small lifespan is sent. The 
counter value starts at 1 and increases by 1 for each 
group of three ICMP packets. Having received a 
packet, router decreases TTL value by 1. Whenever 
TTL=0, packet is not sent further and TRM as the 
sender receives ICMP message ‹Time Exceeded›. 
TRM remembers one line of output data for each 
router from which the message ‹Time Exceeded› was 
received. When the receiving host i.e. the specified 
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router receives ICMP-request packet, it returns an 
ICMP-message ‹Unreachable Port›, indicating that 
the packet reached the destination, thus, end of the 
trace. This happens because TRM intentionally uses 
an invalid port number to force an error. TRM builds 
a list of intermediate routers, starting from a distance 
of one transition and ending with the destination host 
and sends it to DB. Flow-chart of processes involved 
in this method, as a result of executing command № 4 
(Get route using ICMP-request), is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Start
Select destination node
Time exceeded?
N
Send echo-request to 
destination node
Process received information
Counter==0
Message <destination node unreachable>
Launch traceroute utility specifying 
destination node as final host
Generate ICMP type 8
End
Response 
received?
Y
Populate packet field with 
information about IP-address of 
source of response
TTL==1
Counter +=1
N
ICMP response 
type 11?
Y
Counter ==3?
Y
N
Y
Generate ICMP Type 8TTL +=1
ICMP response 
type 0 or 3?
Await time exceeded signal
Populate remaining packet field
Y
N
N
Figure 7: Packet Tracing algorithm using ICMP-request 
 
Though the TTL field of IPv4 has been renamed to 
Hop Limit in IPv6, the message format, basically, is 
the same for ICMPv4 and ICMPv6. Regardless of the 
name, the field still has the same basic purpose of 
keeping a datagram from wandering the Internet 
forever [41]. 
 
Command 5 – Get trusted route 
By command 5 is implemented process of getting 
trusted route by tracing of data flow between two 
points on a topology map created during topology 
definition. The processes involved are analysis of 
formalized RT in DB in order to obtain route of a 
specific packet by selecting starting point IP-address 
(fixing starting for the route) and destination IP-
address, and then identify a row in the formalized RT 
using the selected starting point IP-address; then 
analyzing RT, precisely  by the starting point of the  
route, IP-address (Next hop) of other transit routers to 
the destination IP-address is determined, thus search 
for active IP-addresses of intermediate routers is 
performed iteratively, which gives route of a 
particular packet, which is then recorded into the DB 
as active route. After active routes are defined, 
conversion of RD to RDt (Fig. 3) (as many as 
possible, if not all) within the active routes are done. 
Then, trusted route is gotten by iteratively finding a 
route that passes only through set of RDt from a 
given starting point to a destination point. This 
information about trusted route(s) is stored in DB for 
traffic redirection in the interest of TR from that 
given point to the destination point. 
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After conversion of RD in active routes to RDt, for 
accuracy and time-efficiency, trusted route is 
calculated using modified Dijkstra‘s algorithm [33]. 
Practically, it corresponds to the basic Dijkstra‘s 
algorithms with the exception that it checks 
trustworthiness of every next node (possible next-hop 
node) while finding shortest path before including 
such node in the process of finding shortest path. Any 
node that is not trusted is avoided and excluded in the 
process. Flow-chart of complex processes of getting 
trusted route using modified Dijkstra‘s algorithm is 
shown in Fig. 8. 
 
Start
Select neighboring node N from 
among unvisited C that is 
connected to Z with tentative 
distance D(n) from S
D(n) = D(z) + D(zn)
RD initialization
Select S And define it as Z
Initialization C, S, D(S) == 0, P  
Initialize node identification N == trusted N Controllable?
No
No
N == T
Yes Yes
D(n) < D(z) + D(zn)
No
Yes
Unvisited neighboring 
node N still exists
No
Yes
Node with smallest 
tentative distance D(n) = ZNo
Reverse path from S to T, and 
define as P
P is shortest trusted route 
from S to destination T 
Yes
End
 
 
Figure 8: Modified Dijkstra’s Algorithm 
 
As noted in Fig. 8, RD are set of nodes (vertices) in a 
network, and they are marked as unvisited set C. D is 
tentative distance value, S is initial node and D(S) == 
0 (tentative distance value for initial node S is set it to 
zero). P is shortest path, initially P∞ as path is not 
yet found or determined. D(n) is tentative distance 
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between current (neighboring) node under 
consideration to the initial node S; D(z) − smallest 
known tentative distance from Z to the node S, and 
D(zn) − smallest known tentative distance from the 
neighboring node N to Z. 
 
Algorithm works as follow: 
1. Assign to every node a tentative distance 
value: set it to zero for initial node (i.e. 
D(S)==0 and to infinity for all other nodes 
(P∞); 
2. Set the initial node, S, as current Z. Mark all 
other nodes unvisited. Create a set of all the 
unvisited nodes called unvisited set C; 
3. Select neighboring node N from among 
unvisited C that is connected to initial node 
S; 
4. For each neighboring node N with tentative 
distance D(n), cross-check trustworthiness 
of the node. Every node N that is not trusted 
is excluded and marked as visited; 
5. For each neighboring but yet unvisited 
nodes N that is trusted (i.e. N==Trusted) and 
that is not the destination node (N!=T), 
calculate its tentative distance 
(D(n)=D(z)+D(zn)). Compare the newly 
calculated tentative distance to the current 
assigned value and assign the smaller one 
(i.e. compare if D(n) < D(z)+D(zn));  
6. When all of the neighbors of the current 
node are fully considered, the current node Z 
is marked as visited, and it is removed from 
the unvisited set C; 
7. The visited node with smallest tentative 
distances D(n) is afterward considered as 
new current node Z; 
8. Define path from the new current node Z to 
S as shortest trusted route P from Z to S; 
9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until the target node T 
(destination node) is reached, i.e until 
N==T; 
10. Reverse path P found (when N==T). Then P 
is shortest trusted route from initial 
destination S to the target destination T. 
 
 
It is worth noted that according Tiamiyu (2014), 
using modified Dijkstra‘s algorithm, trustworthiness 
of every RD in a given network is determined in 
accordance with the formula described below: 
Ni ∈ Q, 1 
и  
Q = {a, b, c, d} 2 
where Ni  – network node being cross-checked;  
Q – set of parameters for which the node is checked;  
a, b, c, d – parameters which define the node 
trustworthiness, 
and  
a − determines authentication that node is able to 
perform in the process of verification of its physical 
location, as the node could be trusted due to its 
particular geographical location; 
 
b – identifies a node known to sender router as 
untrusted due to country or corporation in which the 
node is located; 
 
c − determines the average of the measurements of 
the physical location of the node obtained by 
"pinging" the network. The physical location of the 
node can be determined by placing it in a certain 
secured place, for example, in a military base or 
government building; 
 
d − characterize the information found in the node 
that is being stored there for the purpose of 
identification, for example, a software module in the 
form of agent. 
 
In TraConDA, for time-efficiency also, active route is 
found using other applicable algorithm, precisely X-
BDV algorithm described by authors in [32]. A 
recent study (Abraham et al, 2013) showed that X-
BDV algorithm that applies a bidirectional Dijkstra's 
algorithm (BD) for target and exploration queries, 
and X-CHV that runs on top of contraction 
hierarchies does look for routes that are substantially 
different from the shortest path and are locally 
optimal. The work actually was based on finding 
multiple routes between two vertices on a directed 
graph with nonnegative, integral weights on edges. 
And its advantage over other algorithm being used to 
find alternate routes e.g. choice routing algorithm 
[42] is that it is a faster algorithm for continental-
sized networks. Unlike choice routing algorithm, X-
BDV is successful more often (compared to other 
algorithms of its kind). Experiments carried out in 
[32] showed that the algorithm, X-BDV (simplified 
version of BD) is practical for real, continental-sized 
networks, and it can be used to find multiple 
alternative paths. 
 
Thus, in TraConDa, X-BDV algorithm is used to find 
certain number of alternative shortest routes from 
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sender of confidential data to the recipient of the 
same instead of finding all at once. This could reduce 
time to find trusted route considerably as there is 
possibility of getting trusted route from among first 
few active routes found (thus reducing the number of 
RD to be converted to RDt). The number of 
alternative shortest routes can be increased 
accordingly, especially when necessary i.e. when 
trusted route is yet to be found from the sender to the 
recipient. 
 
Flow-chart of complex processes of getting trusted 
route using X-BDV and modified Dijksra‘s 
algorithms is shown in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Conversion of the 
topological map into 
bidirectional
Define M as maximum number of 
routes from sender to the recipient on 
the topological map
Получение t альтернативных кратчайших маршрутов 
от отправителя конфиденциальных данных до 
получателя с помощью X-BDV
Calculate trusted route using modified 
Dijkstra;s algorithm
Trusted route 
found?
Record the trusted route found to DB for 
transfer of confidential data
Y
N
t   M
Y
End
Start
Define necessary quantity 
of active routes and 
designate as t
t+=1
Convert all possible nodes in the 
received active routes to trusted
Message <trusted route 
not found>
Message <trusted route 
found>
N
 
Figure 9: Getting trusted routes using X-BDV and Modified Dijkstra’s Algorithms 
 
Processing of the following messages from TRA by 
TRM are always allowed even in standby mode: 
i. Acknowledgement from TRA about receipt 
of command from TRM. Upon receiving 
such messages, TRM, by code of the 
message, determines the semantic meaning 
of the message and generates a text string 
that characterizes the incoming message. 
ii. Informational messages from TRA about 
routes of transmission of messages, 
determined using ICMP-request or IP-option 
parameter «record route». Upon receipt of 
such messages, TRM, by code and the 
notational content of the message, 
determines the beginning and the end of the 
route, the list of transit routers included in 
the route. 
iii. Informational messages from TRA about 
router‘s RT, received using BGP or SNMP 
protocol. Upon receipt of such messages, 
TRM, by code and the notational content of 
the message, determines router from which 
the RT is received, and puts the received RT 
into the DB. 
 
In the mode of operations with the DB, it is required 
of TRM to:  
 
i. Add new TRA into the DB, modify the 
parameters of selected TRA, remove 
selected TRA from the DB, add additional 
DB entry point for the use of SNMP or BGP 
when accessing the required router for the 
selected TRA; 
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ii. Add new router to the DB, change parameter 
of selected router, remove selected router 
from the DB. 
 
2.4. Trusted routing agent’s operational 
designation and method 
TRA is designed to work in public networks like 
Internet, and in it is realized function of receiving 
control signals from TRM and decrypting them. 
Whenever TRA starts operation, control is passed to 
the block that implements the operation required as 
depicted in the command. Results of the operation are 
transmitted to the input of the block for preprocessing 
and subsequently to the block for sending of results 
and acknowledgment when it is appropriate. 
 
TRA receives control signals from TRM via BCCH 
(Fig. 2) and executes instructions contained therein. 
In addition, ANI module, a component in TRA, helps 
in traffic redirection by intercepting incoming 
packets to RD, check their compliance with the 
requirements and, if necessary, their forwarding. The 
preprocessed results and information received are 
sent to TRM via BCCH. 
 
For program realization of the required tasks of TRA, 
the following modules are being utilized (Fig. 2). A 
basic module for verification of RDt (NV module) 
for self-test of agent, verification of OS stability and 
correctness of node‘s data. Also as in the TRM, a 
network module (ANI module), which, in addition to 
decrypt network packets, can process and single out 
special instruction, determine information within the 
instruction and generate response to the instruction. 
CC module is being used whenever there is necessity 
to change configuration of node (for example, adding 
or deleting static route; enabling or disabling certain 
services, source routing for example; load or reload 
OS (modified or factory version). Scheme of modules 
of TRA, including all internal and external 
interaction, is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
In normal mode, TRA listens to BCCH, awaiting 
commands from TRM. On receiving signal, ANI 
module decrypts and analyzes the signal. In the case 
of nonconformity, signal of non-compliance is sent to 
TRM, otherwise the command is executed. Normally 
ANI, based on analysis of network packets, does 
single out instructions intended for it, decrypts it (if 
necessary) and sends them to one of the modules: 
− NV module, if requested for node 
verification; 
− CC module, if changes to node 
configuration is required; 
thus the followings are types of command TRA 
executes: 
i. Command № 1 – Get node status 
        General information about status of each 
node is collected periodically by TRM using 
probing algorithm for extended 
identification and status monitoring for 
changes that are not initiated by TRM. 
Details about probing algorithm as a 
solution to traffic flow control challenges is 
given in section 4. 
ii. Command № 2 – Modify node configuration 
 
By this command, TRM sends instruction to effect 
specific changes to configuration of a specified RDt, 
For example, information about static routes has to be 
removed each time transmission of confidential 
information is complete so as to bring back the 
network to initial stage in order to maintain secrecy 
of operation of TraConDa. 
 
Having received such instruction and analyzed it in 
ANI module, TRA passes control to CC module, 
which will make the necessary changes to the RDt. 
TRA confirms successful execution of instruction by 
composing and sending applicable response via ANI 
module. The response is transferred via BCCH to 
TRSE module in TRM where it is analyzed and then 
entered into DB. 
 
3. Trusted routing mechanism 
requirements and challenges 
 
3.1. Structural and implementation challenges 
TraConDa is composed of modules such as TRM and 
TRA which in turn are comprised of components like 
MNI and TRI modules. TRM resides in management 
AW. Thus AW manages RD via BCCH that connects 
TRM and ANI module. This control channel provides 
two-way communications. Harmonizing MNI and 
ANI modules requires interaction interface, i.e. strict 
communication protocol. And this communication 
should be carried out by packets that are sent over 
data networks. Developing a protocol requires 
defining packet format and message types. And since 
the packets would pass through different network 
devices, their format must be correct and conform to 
generally accepted standards. In other words, these 
packets must be correct IP-packets (otherwise, they 
would not just get to RD). Therefore, first of all, it is 
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necessary to select the type of IP-packets to be used 
in BCCH, i.e. define higher-level protocol that would 
be used. Basically, RD can forward any valid IP-
packet regardless of its type, and the data contained 
therein. However, in practice, access lists might be 
used, limiting the passage of certain packets. In 
addition, packages of rare, obsolete or undefined 
types can bring suspicion. Other types of packets 
(e.g., TCP) may be tested for the presence of link or 
correctness of the header of higher level (for 
example, TCP could be filtered by port numbers) that 
requires the correctness of this header in the packet. 
Thus, packet type must be common, simple as 
possible, and not arousing suspicion. 
 
Also it is very necessary that traffic be monitored to 
ensure that data are being transferred accordingly, 
and in case of unwanted changes or actions of any 
kind, necessary measures are in place to maintain 
data integrity and confidentiality. TraConDa is to 
achieve these goals among others. Thus for the 
purpose of achieving these, TraConDa  has modular 
structure that comprises TRA and TRM which have 
BCCH as interacting interface. More details about 
these modules of TraConDa and other components 
within them in relation to challenges of implementing 
TraConDa are described further. 
 
3.2. Trusted routing agent’s requirements and 
challenges 
TRA allows for a proper management of RD from 
within. Since RD is controlled by the OS operating 
system, in which traffic control is implemented. For 
implementation of traffic redirection in the interest of 
TR, it is a necessity to implant PM, TRA, in OS so 
that the integrity and confidentiality of the required 
traffic redirection is enforced/provided/monitored by 
this embedded PM. Process of modifying OS of RD 
to implant TRA requires a substantial timeframe (see 
Section 2.1 for details of this process), thus, it is 
carried out in advance, and successfully modified and 
tested OS is stored in DB which is then available 
during TraConDa operation. More about TRA in 
section 2.4. 
 
TRA must aid traffic redirection and be able to read 
and write to memory of RDt. Thus, CC module, a 
component in TRA, allows to read and write required 
data from OS memory, to make changes to the 
working of RD (though this is possible only if the RD 
allows reading and writing to its memory (see section 
2.1 for details on how to make RD a trusted entity i.e. 
have full control (administrative access) after gaining 
remote access to it). In addition, CC helps in traffic 
redirection by adding/modifying static route of RDt 
based on instruction from TRM.  Singling out 
instruction from incoming packets to RD is a 
necessity in TraConDa, and this is why ANI 
intercepts incoming packets, check their compliance 
with the requirements and, if necessary, their 
forwarding to applicable module. 
 
3.3. BCCH operational challenges and 
instruction/protocol format 
Standard control channels (via the console, remote 
telnet or configuration file) have several 
disadvantages as they may not be accessible when 
there is a change in the authentication system (e.g., 
changing of password or access level); also fact about 
their control can be detected easily; furthermore, they 
are limited in functionality since not intended for 
control of undeclared OS modules. All these lead to 
the need for BCCH that directly provides for remote 
control of the embedded TRA modules. As 
interaction interface requires strict communication 
protocol, most preferred protocol for BCCH is the 
use of ICMP protocol. This is because among widely 
used three types of IP-packets that are TCP, UDP and 
ICMP, the first two are more complex and are used to 
transmit data of higher levels, thus, are more likely to 
be filtered or checked. In contrast, the ICMP protocol 
is used for controlling and determination of faults 
[43], so not usually seen. Its flow is usually not 
restricted (except for closed network, where all 
external packets could be filtered). Moreover, ICMP 
packets also helps identify the system as a router 
when router responds to ICMP requests.  ICMP 
message types are ―echo requests‖ and ―echo 
replies‖; a mode which is very like the way a TRA 
module, ANI, operates when responding to requests 
from another module, MNI for instance, via BCCH. 
ICMP echo request and echo response are used in 
common network testing program, ping, to determine 
packet transmission from one node to another. And 
data requests, usually, do not arouse suspicion, 
especially those directed towards RD. In essence, 
basis of interaction interface via BCCH using ICMP 
protocol is ―adequate‖. And for messages from TRM 
to TRCM would be used echo requests, and echo 
reply for responses. 
This is achievable as, according to standard, ICMP-
packets consist of a header and data [44]; and RD, 
when receiving an echo request, changes incoming 
and outgoing addresses in the request, and then sends 
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back echo reply [45], i.e. not drawn to the data field. 
Thus, organizing BCCH transmitted data can be 
resolved in the data field of ICMP-packet without 
any restrictions (except IP-packet size). In case of 
sending such a packet to RD that contains no 
embedded modules i.e. where TRA is not resident, 
this packet will be processed just like an echo request 
and to it is returned echo reply. However, whenever 
response to this special packet, ICMP-request with 
instructions in the data area, comes from TRA, 
BCCH connection is established. There are many 
publications about covert channels in ICMP and IP 
protocols, some of which are by authors in [46, 47, & 
48]. For BCCH security, transmitted data would be 
encrypted using best available cryptosystem. Also 
encryption with symmetric keys set in advance in 
TRM and TRA is possible. For clarity purpose, for 
instance, before ‗packaging‘, when packing data into 
the payload of ICMP packets, quite strong encryption 
would be applied to the data, using, for example, 
3DES, AES-256 or Blowfish, to prevent them from 
‗eavesdropping‘ or takeover by network sniffers on 
the transmission path. This encrypted data is then 
decrypted by TRA, and instruction contained therein 
is carried out. TRA, in turn, encrypts all responses to 
TRM. Furthermore, ICMP tunneling can be 
categorized as an encrypted communication channel 
between two communicating devices as without 
proper deep packet inspection or log review, 
administrators cannot detect this type of traffic 
through their network [49]. 
 
The case is different when data would be transferred 
using TCP/IP, when any applicable cryptosystem 
could be used to encrypt the data but this is not being 
considered as priority as the main purpose of the TR 
mechanism is to prevent third party from having copy 
of confidential data being transferred (encrypted or 
not). If the copy of confidential data (encrypted or 
not) is available to third party during transfer, then 
the main purpose of the TR mechanism itself is 
defeated. Preventing third party from having copy of 
confidential data is of utmost importance because, as 
earlier explained, very strong encryption nowadays 
may eventually become weak encryption.  
 
Furthermore, encryption of confidential data itself 
applies if one cares about data cryptographic 
protection, otherwise ‗plaintext‘ option, which of 
course means no encryption, can be applied. 
Confidential data is being transferred among RDt, 
only through a trusted route (route comprising of 
only RDt). In addition, route is only trusted if the two 
entities being connected, e.g. TRM and TRA or TRA 
and TRA, are trusted. By any change to the trusted 
channel, due to changes in any of the trusted entities, 
the channel is dropped and excluded by excluding 
any compromised RDt from among those 
participating in data transfer. Moreover, confidential 
data are being sent over channel after a trusted route 
is already defined, and this happens only when a 
route passing only through a set of RDt is defined. In 
addition, all RDt in trusted route are being 
administered already by TRM. To this, it could be 
said that a virtual network that is fully under the 
administration of TRM is generated. Above all, there 
exists special algorithm called probing algorithm for 
monitoring the status of RDt among others. This 
probing algorithm is described in details in section 4 
when traffic routes and traffic flow control challenges 
are explained. 
 
For BCCH communication protocol, all fields, 
including headers, must be recorded in the system of 
big-endian (for compatibility of communication 
modules). Packet forwarding can be determined by 
the type of ICMP-packet (request/reply), but for 
simplicity, it makes sense for types of special packets 
to be uniform. Types of these special packets are 
depicted in table 1. 
 
For convenience, all fields can be regarded as 
consisting of four bytes and type of special packet 
can be placed in the second 4-byte data blocks, i.e. 
with offset 4. Thus, field with offset 0 is ‹‹magic 
number›› while that with offset 4 is special packet 
type. Offset 8 is for special packet ID. Assigning 
other fields depend on the type. Required types with 
details about other offsets are listed in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Special Packet Required Type 
 
Designation  
 
 
Instruction 
description 
Field Offset Type 
Special 
packet  
Extra options  
Type  ID 12 16 20 
Node 
verification 
request 
A 1 Node ID   
Response to 
node 
verification 
request 
R 2 Response    
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Designation  
 
 
Instruction 
description 
Field Offset Type 
Special 
packet  
Extra options  
Type  ID 12 16 20 
Data read 
request 
A 3 Node ID   
Response to 
data read 
request 
R 4 Data   
Static routing 
implementation 
setup 
A 3 Node ID 
Initial  
IP-
address 
Destination 
IP-address 
Response to 
static routing 
implementation 
setup 
R 4 Response   
Data request 
from DB 
A 5 Data ID   
Response to 
data request 
from DB 
R 6 Data    
Data storage to 
DB 
A 7 Data ID Data  
Response to 
data storage to 
DB 
R 8 Data ID   
Node 
configuration 
control 
A 9 Node ID 
Response to 
node 
configuration 
control 
R 10 Response 
 
Note: in table 1, special packet type can either be 
«A» for instruction to be carried out or «R» for 
response to instruction. 
 
Instructions to be carried out are normally sent by 
TRM while entity that receives the instructions send 
back responses to them in form of instructions as 
well. Description of instructions considering their 
numbering and types are given below. 
 
Instruction_1. Node verification request 
This instruction is sent to RD (or RDt) from TRM to 
identify if the node is a trusted entity or remain such. 
It is of special packet type 1 and offset 12 in this 
special packet type 1 is the IP-address of node being 
verified. 
Instruction is being used during extended node 
identification stage as well during process of 
monitoring status of node when redirecting traffic. 
 
Instruction_2. Response to node verification 
request 
This instruction is sent to TRM from or RDt as a 
response to node verification request (there is no 
special instruction from RD when TRA is not 
resident in it as then the response from the RD is just 
usual echo reply, which TRM treats as instruction 
that the node is no longer or has not been a trusted 
entity).  
Whenever RDt sends response, it places the data 
being sent starting from offset 12 in this special 
packet type 2. Instruction is being used as well during 
extended node identification stage and during process 
of monitoring status of node when redirecting traffic. 
 
Instruction_3. Data read request 
This instruction is sent to RD (or RDt) from TRM. In 
special packet type 3 by which request to read data 
from OS memory is made, it is necessary to restrict 
the size, taking into account possible size of IP 
packet. Offset 12 in special packet type 3 is the IP-
address of node from which data is being 
copied/read. 
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_4. Response to data read request 
This instruction is sent to TRM from RD or RDt as a 
response to data read request. Whenever RDt sends 
response, it places the data being sent starting from 
offset 12 in this special packet type 2. 
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_5. Static routing implementation 
setup 
This instruction is sent to RDt by TRM whenever 
TRI has to redirect traffic by means of static routing. 
In this special packet type 5, offset 12 is the ID of the 
node on which to setup static routing, offset 16 is the 
initial IP-address that is also the node while offset 20 
is the destination IP-address (the address to which the 
node has to forward traffic to). Instruction is being 
used during forced routing stage of implementing TR 
mechanism.  
 
Instruction_6. Response to static routing 
implementation setup 
This instruction is sent to TRM from RDt as a 
response to static routing implementation request. 
RDt places the data being sent as response starting 
from offset 12 in this special packet type 6 like other 
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responses. When the response is not in accordance 
with requirements, the node is regarded as untrusted 
entity, and necessary measures are taken. Instruction 
is being used during forced routing stage of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_7. Request to DB 
This instruction is sent to DM by TRM to get data. In 
this special packet type 7, offset 12 is the ID of the 
data being requested for. 
 
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_8. Response to request from DB 
This instruction is a response to request to DB, and it 
has data being requested for starting from offset 12.  
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_9. Data storage to DB 
This instruction is normally sent to DB for storage of 
data. In this special packet type 9, data being stored is 
placed starting from offset 16 while the data ID itself 
is at offset 12. 
 
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_10. Response data storage to DB 
This special packet type 10 is sent as response to data 
storage to DB. It has data at offset 12 that indicates 
whether process is successful or not.  
Instruction is being used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism.  
 
Instruction_11. Request to change node 
configuration 
This instruction is normally sent to RDt to effect 
some necessary changes in the interest of trusted 
routing, for example, changes like enabling/disabling 
source routing, enabling/disabling static routing, 
disabling/removing TRA etc. In this special packet 
type 11, ID of the node where changes has to be 
effected is placed at offset 12. 
 
Instruction can be used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism, especially when RDt 
is compromised.  
 
Instruction_12. Response to request to change 
node configuration 
This special packet type 12 is sent as response to 
request to change node configuration. Like response 
to data storage to DB, it has data at offset 12 that 
indicates whether process is successful or not.  
 
Instruction can be used practically at all stages of 
implementing TR mechanism, especially when RDt 
is compromised. 
 
3.4. Trusted routing manager’s operational 
challenges 
TRM remotely controls RD via BCCH. It provides 
management console for operator and sends special 
messages via BCCH to RD. Also it retrieves and 
prints special messages received and maintains, 
stores, processes information about used RD and 
actions performed. 
 
From TRM, packets to be processed should not be 
fragmented so as to avoid necessity to reassemble the 
packet in the RD. Also there must be uniformity as 
per packet type for compatibility of the modules as 
well as means to recognize special packet so that it is 
easily singled out by applicable module. Thus, 
‹‹magic number›› (for example, 0xD0C3C0FD which 
can be regarded as sequence of abbreviations and 
interpretations from D0 check 3rust Condition 0F 
Device) that is written to the ICMP-packet at offset 0 
(at the beginning of the data) can be used to identify a 
special packet. Then a field indicating the type of the 
special packet can be placed after this. 
 
4. Trusted routes and traffic flow 
control challenges in TraConDa 
 
The process of embedding modules, TRA, into RD 
OS implies, as well, making the RD a trusted entity, 
RDt, since TRM will now have full control over the 
RD. Getting trusted route is achievable when there 
are some RDt already in the regenerated network as a 
result of embedding TRA modules into RD OS (see 
Fig. 3).  
 
 
 
Thus, from the results obtained from various packet 
route tracing and RT access methods that are stored 
in DB, after resolving IP-aliases among others, a 
trusted route is determined by finding at least a route 
that passes only through a set of RDt from a packet 
sending point to a packet receiving point (from a 
sender to a specified IP-address) (see Fig. 9). Making 
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data packets passing through the RDt is necessary to 
have real control over the delivery of packets from 
the sender to the recipient by controlling and 
monitoring the passage of packets. Protocol stack 
TCP/IP provides guaranteed delivery of packets 
between the sender and receiver, so in order to reduce 
network load and increase the data transfer rate, 
additional control measures are not necessary. 
 
Traffic control during process of sending information 
from a given sender to a specified recipient is 
performed as follows: 
 
TRM sends traffic control signal to TRA (Fig. 2). If 
there exist a trusted route to the destination from the 
sender to the recipient (Fig. 9), the packet is 
forwarded along the trusted route to the recipient IP-
address by source routing or by using static routing 
(Fig. 10), otherwise the processes of identifying and 
gain full control over RD in the network (finding 
more active routes to the destination and converting 
RD within those active routes to RDt) and adding the 
information about new RDt to the DB are started 
(Fig. 3). 
 
DB
TRM
RD2
RD1
RDt
RDt_2
RDt_1
RDt_4
RDt_5
RDt_7
RDt_6
RDt_8
RDt_9
RDt_3
All possible routes
Route by Dijkstra s algorithm
Forced (trusted) route  
 
Figure 10: Forced Routing in TraConDA 
 
Whenever a trusted route exists between sender and 
recipient, data is transferred along it by forwarding 
the traffic to next-hop IP-address in accordance with 
list of IP-addresses that comprises the trusted route. 
In the absence of trusted route and impossibility of 
getting one, message about non-availability of trusted 
route to the destination is sent to TRM, and this may 
imply starting the whole processes of TR mechanism 
again. 
 
Monitoring the status of the trusted RD implies that 
active trusted route remains active and valid. And 
that the status of embedded TRA does not change 
during the data transfer session. Once the security of 
any RDt is compromised or unexpected change 
occurs in the RDt, the router is excluded from 
transferring data immediately (and data transfer is 
halted). Then, to continue transfer of data from the 
sender to the receiver, new trusted route is either 
recalculated or chosen from DB i.e. from among the 
ones found earlier during the processes of trusted 
route(s) calculation among all RDt within active 
routes (Fig. 9). 
 
In practice, network administration concludes that a 
node is operational if in response to the ICMP-
request came ICMP-reply from the device [50]. 
However, in TraConDa, during the process of data 
transfer, it is necessary, in addition to ICMP-request, 
to check periodically the existence and accuracy of 
the information about TRA in the OS of RD as well 
as general status of RDt for presence of various types 
of implant, critical vulnerabilities and other features 
that affect security of transmitted data, as well as the 
correctness of the active RT. Thus, the agent, TRA, 
guarantees that RD (OS inclusive) is ―certified for 
TR‖, hence, it is trusted. 
 
Therefore, we consider extended node identification 
using probe algorithm (assuming that agent is 
resident in node as guarantor of trustworthiness of the 
node). 
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The method is based on sending avalanche-like 
probes and collecting responses from them. First, 
TRM sends probing packets to all network nodes and 
each TRA processes the incoming probe by checking 
if it has already processed the probe earlier or not (a 
situation that is possible because of "looping"). If the 
probe was processed earlier, the TRA redistributes it 
to all connected node excluding only the node from 
which it came. Normally, TRA crosschecks the node 
where it is resident when a probe packet is received 
and generates response packet that are sent the same 
way as probing packet. When TRA receives the same 
response packet again, it stops its further 
redistribution.  TRM collects all response packets and 
systemize them into identification table. Probing 
algorithm in TR is shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
Start
Send probe packet to all possible TRA
End
has probe entered
TRA of the lower level?
Broadcast probe to all 
incident nodes, including 
the one from which it came
Reception of probe by node
Inclusion of information 
into the probe
Generate status of node to 
which that particular TRA is 
responsible for
Destroy probe 
packet
Is probe from TRM?
Y
Y
Has probe already
passed through
given TRA?
N
Y
Fixing into TRA the information 
contained in the probe
N
Include information 
into the probe
Broadcast probe to all 
incident nodes, excluding 
the one from which it came
Remember node from 
where probe came
N
Generate status of node 
to which that particular 
TRA is responsible for
Include information 
into the probe
 
Figure 11: Probing Algorithm in TR 
 
This probing algorithm allows identifying node, the 
existence and location of which is initially unknown, 
using special network packets. 
 
5. Evaluation 
 
As pure theoretical study of TraConDa is difficult as 
result of its extremely difficult formalization without 
losing the essence that is also limited only by 
algorithmization, and practically, requires the full 
implementation of the PM embedding process in 
GDTN (Fig. 3) and gathering of factual statistics, it is 
expedient to research into its properties using 
appropriate simulation model, a model of TN with 
TR. Simulation experiments were carried out and the 
article on imitating experiments for investigation of 
TR mechanism (Tiamiyu & Bunevich, 2014) 
indicated effectiveness of TR mechanism in TN. The 
simulation results showed that application of TR 
mechanism simultaneously improves security of TN, 
as well as confidentiality and identifiability of traffic. 
So also functional stability. Furthermore, TR 
mechanism simulation had shown that the more the 
RDt and the more the given time for data transfer, the 
greater the chance of the message (confidential data) 
reaching the destination. Considering better 
performance, TR mechanism simulation also had 
shown that for timely but secure transfer of 
confidential data, there is a certain optimum, when 
―timeliness‖ (i.e. given time for data transfer to the 
destination while increasing intensity of controlling 
RD (more RD to RDt)) is already quite great, and 
―secrecy‖ (i.e. confidentiality of data being 
transferred while increasing intensity of controlling 
RD) also is still great. This optimum is functional 
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objective for TR mechanism optimization for better 
performance [51]. 
 
TR mechanism is also scalable like VPN and MPLS 
VPNs but provides for better data integrity and 
confidentiality. The main advantage of this proposed 
security mechanism, TraConDa, over other existing 
is that having copy of data (encrypted or not) by third 
party is being prevented by excluding (from 
participating in data transfer) compromised RD and 
any other RD that do not satisfy all criteria (in 
accordance with requirements for TR) for it to be 
called trusted RD.  
 
Further, the imitating experiment aids at performing 
qualitative assessment of the impact of TR 
mechanism using SANS/GIAC method, method that 
evaluates "severity" of network attack that resulted 
from the implementation of the risk of network 
attack. As evaluating the effectiveness of TR 
mechanism in GDTN is directly related to their 
information security and can be, in particular, carried 
out through the evaluation of the risks associated 
with threats to network security. One such technique 
is generally accepted SANS/GIAC, developed at the 
Institute of SANS (System Administration, 
Networking and Security Institute) and the center of 
the analysis of computer incidents GIAC (Global 
Incident Analysis Center) [52, 53 & 54]. This 
technique evaluates "severity" of network attack (Sv), 
which is determined by the value of the risk of this 
attack. The magnitude of the risk is determined by 
the probability of the success of the attack, Lethality 
(Le) and the magnitude of possible damage, 
Criticality (Cr). The magnitude of vulnerability of 
TN is determined by effectiveness of system 
countermeasures (Sc) and network countermeasures 
(Nc), applied against such type of threat. 
Severity of attack is determined by a numerical scale 
from 10 to 10 in accordance with the formula: 
Sv = (Cr + Le)  (Sc + Nc).    
 (1) 
Cr, Le, Sc and Nc are determined on a 5-point scale as 
shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Applicable SANS/GIAC 5-point scale 
 
5-
point 
scale 
Cr  Le Sc Nc 
5-
point 
scale 
Cr  Le Sc Nc 
5 
Data 
security, 
router, 
firewall, 
DNS 
server 
Attack 
linked to 
obtaining 
root 
access on 
the remote 
system 
modern 
secured 
operating 
system, 
installed 
all the 
software 
correctio
n, the 
additiona
l 
network 
protectio
n 
One 
method of 
network 
security, 
firewall, is 
the only 
entry point 
to the 
network, 
which 
implements 
the 
principle of 
minimizing 
privileges 
4 
Data by 
addressin
g and 
routing, 
email 
gateway 
DoS while 
implement
ing 
network 
attack 
 
Several 
security 
mechanism
s, firewall 
and 
presence of 
additional 
network 
entry points 
3 
Communi
cation 
resources 
Decline in 
functional
ity, 
introducti
on of false 
informatio
n, 
obtaining 
non-
privileged 
user rights 
on the 
remote 
system 
OS with 
special 
security 
features, 
some 
software 
correctio
n not 
installed, 
old 
version 
of OS 
Several 
security 
mechanism
s with 
organizatio
nal 
measures 
2 
Data 
interactio
ns, UNIX 
workstati
on 
Disclosure 
of 
confidenti
al 
informatio
n in the 
course of 
unauthoriz
ed 
network 
access 
 
Firewall 
that solves 
all that is 
not 
explicitly 
prohibited 
(permissive 
access 
control 
policy) 
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5-
point 
scale 
Cr  Le Sc Nc 
1 
Locally 
processed 
data, PC 
Opening 
topologica
l and flow 
structure, 
probabilit
y of 
success of 
attack is 
very small 
OS 
without 
special 
security 
features, 
password
s are sent 
over the 
network 
in clear 
text, 
non-
existence 
of 
password
s 
manage
ment 
policy 
Only 
organizatio
nal 
measures 
 
NETWORK COUNTERMEASURES while applying 
TR mechanism, NTc, in GDTN can be assessed on a 
5-point scale as follows: 
• 5: liquidate, eliminate the threat of attack 
• 3: partially or indirectly weakens threat 
• Equals to Nc: out of TR mechanism‘s control 
 
Based on these scales, we find, for example, Sv 
associated with DoS attacks resulting from typical 
ping-flooding. 
 
Accordingly, Cr = 3, Le = 4, Sc = 3
*
, Nc = 3 и NTc = 5 
(* — in TR mechanism, Sc is assumed equals to 3 for 
all case (i.e. for all cases, average magnitude is 
chosen), moreover Sc is outside TR mechanism‘s 
control.  
 
Applying formula 1: 
Sv = (3 + 4) - (3 +3) = 1 
Thus, Sv in this case is 1 as there are special tools 
against such network attack (notwithstanding, this 
attack needs attention of expert). 
Further, we find ST that is Sv for the same attack 
when TR mechanism is applied  
ST = (3 + 4) - (3 +5) = -1.  
Severity, associated with DoS attacks resulting from 
typical ping-flooding declined further with the 
application of TR. 
Similarly are calculated Sv and ST in relation to other 
IST in GDTN. The results are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Risk value of network attacks with and 
without TR 
 
№ 
Network  
attack 
being 
estimated 
Description   Cr Le Sc Nc NTc Sv ST 
1.  IST-1 
Data acquisition 
threat by traffic 
analysis 
5 2 3 4 5 0 -1 
2.  IST-2.1 
Threat of port 
protocol 
detection 
2 3 3 4 5 -2 -3 
3.  IST-2.2 
Threat of 
identification of 
active network 
services 
2 3 3 4 5 -2 -2 
4.  IST-3.1 
Threat of 
substitution of 
trusted object of 
network with 
establishment of 
a virtual 
connection 
4 2 3 1 5 2 -2 
5.  IST-3.2 
Threat of 
substitution of 
trusted object of 
network without 
establishment of 
a virtual 
connection 
4 2 3 1 5 2 -2 
6.  IST-4.1 
Threat of 
imposing a false 
route for the 
purpose of 
intercepting 
traffic, for 
example 
4 2 3 4 5 -1 -2 
7.  IST-4.2 
Threat of 
imposing a false 
route using, for 
example, ICMP 
protocol to 
disrupt 
communications 
2 4 3 4 3 -1 -2 
8.  IST-5.1 
Threat of 
introducing false 
ARP-server 
5 3 3 3 5 2 2 
9.  IST-5.2 
Threat of 
introducing of 
false DNS-server 
by intercepting 
DNS-request 
5 3 3 3 5 2 0 
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№ 
Network  
attack 
being 
estimated 
Description   Cr Le Sc Nc NTc Sv ST 
10.  IST-5.3 
Threat of 
introducing of 
false DNS-server 
by storming 
DNS-responses 
in computer 
network 
5 3 3 3 5 2 2 
11.  IST-5.4 
Threat of 
introducing of 
false DNS-server 
by storming 
DNS-responses 
in DNS-server 
5 3 3 3 5 2 2 
12.  IST-6.1 
Threat of 
reducing 
bandwidth and 
network 
performance by 
Ping flooding, 
ICMP-flooding, 
FTP-flooding 
3 4 3 3 5 1 -1 
13.  IST-6.2 
Threat of 
exhausting 
network 
resources by 
SYN-flooding 
and messages 
type Smurf and 
Spam 
3 4 3 3 5 1 -1 
14.  IST-6.3 
Threat of 
violating logical 
network 
connectivity by 
changing RT or 
identification/aut
hentication 
information 
3 4 3 3 5 1 -1 
№ 
Network  
attack 
being 
estimated 
Description   Cr Le Sc Nc NTc Sv ST 
15.  IST-6.4 
Threat of failure 
or 
malfunctioning 
of network 
services by 
directional 
storming query 
or transfer of 
non-standard 
packages 
3 4 3 3 5 1 -1 
16.  IST-7 
Threat of remote 
starting of 
applications 
1 3 3 1 3 0 -4 
17.  IST-8 
Threat of 
hardware 
failures in 
information and 
telecommunicati
on systems 
3 4 3 1 3 3 -1 
18.  IST-9 
Threat of 
software failures 
in information 
and 
telecommunicati
on systems 
3 4 3 1 3 3 -1 
 
Severity, associated with network attacks in GDTN is 
shown in Fig. 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Security Evaluation in GDTN with and without TR 
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As seen in Fig. 12 and table 3, applying this 
mechanism, the vast majority of the threats are either 
liquidated or eliminated. Details in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Impacts of TR on various types of 
Network Threats 
 
IST type 
Possibility of elimination in 
TR mechanism 
IST-1, IST-3.1, 
IST-3.2, IST-4.1, 
IST-5.1, IST-5.2, 
IST-5.3, IST-5.4 
Eliminated by TR by 
"controlling" or redirect traffic 
only in accordance with 
package trusted routes 
IST-6.1, IST-6.2, 
IST-6.3, IST-6.4 
Eliminated by load control on 
routers and "controlling" of 
nearby network nodes 
IST-4.2, IST-7, 
IST-8, IST-9 
Can be eased indirectly by 
redirecting traffic on a more 
sustainable/reliable route 
IST-2.1, IST-2.2 Out of TR action/control 
 
Lastly, advantages of the proposed TraConDa that is 
based on TR mechanism are evaluated from the view 
point of some of the requirements. 
 
Requirement 1: Identification of trusted nodes: 
   
Once it is known that the device is a router, and the 
kind of running OS, it is necessary to decide on 
whether it is a trusted RD, i.e. RDt or not. RD is 
trusted if already TRA is resident in it. Though it can 
be assumed that a RD is trusted based on other 
criteria. In the RU Patent № 150245 (2015) on 
trusted routing device in telecommunication networks 
— ustroystvo doverennoy marshrutizatsii v 
telekommunikatsionnykh setyakh (Tiamiyu, 2015) 
are mentioned some of these criteria. But as there is 
necessity to have full control over RD participating in 
transmission of data during process of TR 
mechanism, for TraConDa, RD is accepted as trusted 
when TRA resides in it.  
 
Requirement 2: Definition of trusted route: 
 
From among RDt within active routes, a route from a 
source to a destination is sourced for analytically or 
using modified Dijkstra‘s algorithm [33]. Such route 
passing only through a set of RDt is a trusted route as 
traffic through such route is fully under control of 
TRM located at AW. Trusted routes passing through 
only trusted nodes (that are as well remotely 
controllable and under monitoring) are obtained by 
gaining full control on untrusted nodes in the active 
routes within regenerated network (when necessary 
and where it is possible) to prevent unauthorized 
access. 
 
Requirement 3: Monitoring and control over trusted 
RD and trusted route: 
 
TRM controls information flows via trusted routes as 
well as the status of trusted routes by monitoring the 
status of the RDt to ensure that RDt regularly 
transmit data according to their RT and as instructed 
via command from TRM, and that TRA that resides 
in RDt continue functioning as stipulated. 
 
6. Recommendation 
 
Considering the structure of OSPF, it is possible to 
modify SPF algorithm therein. Thus, modified 
Dijkstra‘s algorithm can be exchanged for SPF 
algorithm in OSPF in other to have modified OSPF 
(i.e. OSPF based on trust) that is then used to obtain 
trusted routing table for data transfer. As finding best 
path/route using OSPF protocol is actually done by 
finding such in topological table that is a road map of 
any given network topology and that contains all 
possible routing information paths (routes/networks), 
additional column can be added to topological table 
where information about trustworthiness of each RD 
in the topological table could be stored.  
 
Of course, this entails finding extra information, 
information to decide the trustworthiness of RD, 
while collecting information about each RD on a 
network (i.e. during topological table build up). This 
extra information can be stored as Boolean values of 
YES or NO (True or False) to indicate existence and 
non-existence of criteria for the RD to be tagged as 
trusted entity. Thus, the existence of such column in 
topological table allows modified Dijkstra‘s 
algorithm to calculate trusted route. In essence, 
applying this, routing in the resulted network would 
be based on trust that is based on the trustworthiness 
of participating RD. However, participating RD have 
to meet certain trust requirements among which could 
be the presence of PM in the form of agent or other 
criteria that make the RD a trusted entity. Further 
studies on TraConDa could be based on this and other 
possible ways of implementing this TR mechanism in 
GDTN. 
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7. Discussion 
 
TraConDa, based on TR mechanism, is the process of 
planning the transfer of information flow on the 
calculated route through TN nodes, excluding the 
possibility of tampering with the information in any 
form while the information stream is passing through 
the TN nodes [5]. Thus, TraConDa is for remote 
control of RD to allow for traffic redirection in the 
interest of TR (i.e. preventing unauthorized access to 
data being transferred) within GDTN, and it is 
structured functionally so as to guarantee and 
maintain data integrity and confidentiality while data 
passes through GDTN from a sender to the recipient. 
Of course, proposed TraConDa has agent, TRA, that 
will reside in remote RD but the functions of this 
agent is strictly for the purpose of ensuring data 
integrity and confidentiality by monitoring the status 
of the remote RD and its RT to provide information 
necessary for one of components of TraConDa, the 
TRM, so that it can plan traffic redirection (when 
necessary) of the packets originating from AW where 
TRM resides. The agent, TRA, will not tamper with 
any other packets except the ones from its owner, 
thus, its presence poses no threat of any kind to the 
owner and users of the RD. RD where TRA is 
resident is referred to as RD under full control of 
TRM and thus, it is a RDt. 
 
Importance of development of special software 
complex for TN traffic control in the interest of TR 
cannot be over-emphasized considering recent 
development in security of data over networks like 
Internet. The set of techniques and realization 
methods of TR mechanism on which TraConDa is 
based allow: 
 
I. For secure transfer of information from the 
sender to the recipient. 
II. Dynamically generate active trusted routes 
between sender and receiver. 
III. Use secure BCCH for control of data 
transmission. 
IV. Gain full control over RD by embedding 
TRA in its OS, which guarantees 
functioning of RD in the interest of TR. 
 
Architectural and functional design of TraConDa is 
for control of traffic flows to avoid tampering with 
data in any form, thereby guaranteeing confidentiality 
and integrity of the data while making the data 
available to the recipient. In other words, the main 
objective of architectural and functional design of 
TraConDa is to prevent third party from having copy 
of transmitted data.  
More precisely, illegal confidential data copying is 
prevented in RD by avoiding or excluding 
compromised RD that, as a result, are not trusted (and 
cannot be made a trusted entity). This exclusion 
further prevents network attacks of various type 
during confidential data transfer process, among 
which are session hijacking, DoS, DDoS and Man-in-
the-middle attacks. 
 
In this work, it is accepted that trust relationships 
between nodes is established only between two RDt, 
as any line of connection between two trusted nodes 
is regarded as trusted channel. In addition, as TRM 
automatically becomes remote administrator of those 
RDt, all processes are being monitored and 
controlled. Sending data from a RDt to another RDt 
that is directly connected to it is secure. Therefore, a 
trusted route among many possible routes between 
the sender and recipient is chosen and used in routing 
data (source routing). This implies that data transfer 
is via trusted channels among RDt. 
 
Furthermore there are always tens of other RD within 
GDTN, e.g. Internet, to replace ‗compromised‘ RDt. 
Lastly, the status of RDt should not necessarily be 
permanent, i.e. keeping RD under control of TRM is 
a scenario that can be changed as RD can be released 
as soon as it is no longer needed (when confidential 
data already sent) by replacing the modified OS with 
the original (unmodified) OS of the RD. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Data encryption is good when considering data 
integrity and confidentiality but advancement in 
technology could render secrecy of encrypted data 
useless, thus the proposed TraConDa that is based on 
TR mechanism is very appropriate and good means 
to an end for those who cherish confidentiality and 
integrity but cannot do away with Internet when 
transferring information since the methods therein 
inhibit third party having access or copy the data 
being transmitted, encrypted or not. No copy of data, 
nothing to manipulate or decrypt now or later which 
implies that the data integrity and confidentiality are 
maintained while making the data available to the 
recipient. Moreover, requirements for TR mechanism 
on which TraConDa is based can be met easily, using 
standard tools and standard procedures. 
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